Iraq Levies 1915-1932 By Brigadier J Gilbert Browne CMG. CBE. DSO.       CHAPTER I   1915-1919   IN 1915, Major J.I.Eadie (Later Lieut.Colonel J.I. Eadie, D.S.O.) of the Indian Army, who was then Special Service Officer in the Muntafiq Division in Mesopotamia, recruited forty Mounted Arabs from the tribes round Nasiriyeh, on the Euphrates. For duty under the Intelligence Department. From this small force of forty men was gradually built up a force, which, after various changes of name, were finally called LEVIES; and which from a strength of 40 in 1915, rose to 6,199 in May 1922, after which date the gradual cutting down of units, or transfer to the Iraq Army began. The following is an attempt to give an account of this force, whose organization changed from a small mounted contingent to a mixed force of all arms; whose personnel changed from entirely Arabs, to a mixed force of Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans and Yezidis, and finally to almost entirely Assyrians; and whose area of use was first of all limited entirely to the country south of Baghdad, later entirely to Kurdistan, and now, as their end approaches, they are gradually taking over stations in the South again. Major Eadies forty men, at first known locally as the Muntafiq Horse, were soon increased to sixty, and were called Arab Scouts. Their duties were many of various, and included reconnoitering for British columns which were operating in the area. They were allowed to wear their own form of dress, produced their own horsed, saddlery, rifles, arms and ammunition, and provided their own shelter for themselves and their animals. They formed the nucleus of the 5th Euphrates Levy.   In March 1916, another small mounted force, also sixty strong, was raised by Major Hamilton, the Political Officer at Nasiriyeh. This was called the Political Guard. This force acted as guard to the Political Officer during his tours of the Division, and carried out Police duties in the town and district. They were paid at the same rates, and enlisted under the same conditions of the Arab Scouts. In June 1916, after the Fall of Kut, a corps of guards for the river and telegraph line in the Qurnah, Amarah and Basrah areas, was raised. This corps was divided to correspond to Political Divisions, and acted under Assistant Political Officers. These formed the nucleus of the 3rd Tigris Levy, and the Qurnah District Police. In this same month the Arab Scouts and the Political Guard were amalgamated, and renamed the Nasiriyeh Mounted Guard. The strength of this force was raised from 120 to 150, and by the end of the year to 250. A further increase to 350, took place in April 1917, and by July, by adding other forces raised by the Civil Commissioners, the force had become 500 mounted men, and 400 dismounted men. In 1916 it was decided that the force must have a distinctive uniform, and here a difficulty arose. The only clothing for the legs available was either shorts or riding breeches, and the Arabs refused to wear either, considering that such an exposure of their lower limbs indecent, and against all custom. A compromise was effected by which they wore their Arab robes over the uniform. However, by 1917 they became used to wearing the dress of the British soldier, and this was adopted throughout the force. The force continued to grow, and seems to have had different names in different areas. Thus we find on 12th April 1918, that the Hillah Shabana or 2nd Euphrates Levy under Major C.A.Boyle (Later Major C.A.Boyle, D.S.O) were used; this being the first operation in which this force is mentioned. This was the Madhatiyah, to destroy towns and forts, collect revenue, and make certain arrests. They covered one hundred and ten miles on this expedition without any horse casualties, destroyed eighty-four towers, collected some of the revenue and obtained surety for the rest, and brought in eight people who were wanted. On the 21st April the same Levy, seventy mounted men and one hundred dismounted, made an expedition to Jerbonieh and destroyed twenty-seven towers and burned two villages. The expedition lasted three days. The mounted men were eleven hours in the saddle each day. No one in the force fell out.   The Great War came to an end; but the work of this force increased. Their name at the end of 1918 was changed to Shabana, a name in use in Turkish times, and already in use to a certain extent. The duties were now to supply the executive needs of the Civil Administration. The organization, administration, and pay of the force, and strength of 5,467 were laid down in a memorandum of 8th October 1918. It was intended that the Shabana should be a striking force, and should become the nucleus of the future Arab Army. The name Shabana was reminiscent of many abused in Turkish times, and generally unpopular, and the name of the force was again changed to Muntafiq Horse. And this name was again changed, the whole force in March 1919 being named Militia, though the name Muntafiq Horse seems to have continued as the name of the Mounted troops of the area. Major C.A.Boyle was Inspecting Officer of the Militia with Headquarters of Baghdad. It was during this year that a standard uniform for the force as laid down, the force as re-armed with the short British .303 rifle, and a voluntary system of recruiting was introduced. So far local Sheikhs and headmen had been called on to produce men, and those produced were not exactly voluntary soldiers. This year was fairly eventful, and the force saw a good deal of service, before narrating this, it is best to show the changes in organization, administration, and location of the force. In July 1919, the name of the force was changed again from Militia to Levies, in use now for the first time, and on August 1st the Levy and Gendarmerie Orders were published. These orders defined control of the Levies, and the duties of the Inspecting Officer of the Levies, which were limited to Iinspection and administration. Therefore by these Orders, Levies were under the orders of three different people:-   1. The Inspecting Officer. 2. The Political Officer of the Area. 3. The local Administrative Commandant. Moreover the budget was dealt with by the Inspecting Officer, except in the Kirkuk, Sulainmani and Mosul Liwas, where Political Officers dealt with it. This division of Control, both financially and in administrative matters, was great disadvantage. The control of the Inspecting Officer of the force over his troops, varied very much with the personality of the Political Officer in whose area they were.   Levy headquarters began to expand and A & Q Branch were formed in September. The force was divided into two parts:- (a) A Striking Force at Headquarters of the Administrative Area. This numbered 3,075 and was under Levy Headquarters for training and other purposes. It was split up into detachments of varying sizes, throughout the country. (b) District Police numbering 1,786 under the Political Officers, and only inspected from time to time by Levy Headquarters.   On 12th August, 1919, the force changed its name for the eighth time, becoming Arab and Kurdish Levies. A memorandum was issued giving administrative details, which were however only brought into effect a year later. The chief point was that three Deputy Inspector-Generals were appointed, and for purposes of command and administration, the country was divided into three Levy areas, each under its respective Inspecting Officer, Deputy Inspecting Officer, or an Assistant Inspecting Officer, with a Staff Captain, and an Orderly Officer to assist him. The areas were- A-Area Headquarters- Hillah. B-Area HQ- Baghdad. C-Area HQ- Mosul. At the time this memorandum was drawn up the Levies were run by an Inspecting Officer and a small staff consisting of an Adjutant and Quartermaster, and no actual change took place in this arrangement for the present, nor was the area system brought into effect for a year. This memorandum also laid down the general circumstances in which the Levies could be called on. For minor operations the Political Officer could call on them; but if the duty for which he wanted them involved absence fro their post for Twenty-four hours, permission from the Inspecting Officer of the area was required. Also no action likely to involve the force in definite hostilities was to be undertaken without reference to the Military Area Commander.   The organization of the force was also laid down. Mounted Levies were in Squadrons of 100, and Troops of 25. Dismounted in Companies of 100 and Platoons of 25. The memorandum gave the names and locations of units as below; but, in certain areas, such as a Samara and Khanaqin, this does not seem to have been carried into effect.   1st Euphrates Levy- Dulaim. 2nd- Hillah. 3rd- Shamiyah. 4th- Diwanyieh. 5th- Nasiriyeh.   1st Tigris Levy at Samara. 2nd- Kut. 3rd- Amara. Dier-ex-Zor Levy at Deir-ez-Zor. Baqubah Levy- Baqubah. Khanaqin- Khanaqin. Zobeir- Basrah. Kirkuk- Kirkuk. Sulaimani- Sulaimani. Mosul Gendarmerie- Mosul. It was intended also to have a new Levy at Suq es Shuyukh to keep order in the marshes, but this never appears to been raised. The personnel of the force at this time was drawn from: ARABS. Mainly townspeople or from settled tribes. The desert tribes did not take kindly to discipline. A few old Arab officers of the Turkish Army also joined up. KURDS. These joined chiefly the Sulaimani and Arbil Levies, and the Mosul Gendarmerie. KIRKUKLIS. These are Turkoman people and joined the Kut, Baqubah and Kirkuk Levies.   The training of the Levies was laid down in a memorandum issued in November 1919. They were ordered to be practiced in rapid advances, flank attacks, advanced and rear-guard action, and marsh fighting. For work in the river areas, work with aeroplanes, armored cars, and gunboats. They had also to be trained for mountain warfare for the northern areas, and for desert warfare anywhere to the west of Iraq. One difficulty was to find officers for this force. The Sheikhly class did not take kindly to the discipline required compared with their own free life, and those who did come were found, as a rule, unsuitable. Therefore the majority of officers of the Arab Levies were promoted from the ranks, and they were not far ahead of their own men in training and experience. This affected their prestige and powers of command. I will now give an account of the work of the Levies during this year. The first operation was on February 25th, when the 5th Euphrates Levy under Captain F.W.Hall left their station at midnight to deal with Sheikh Badr and his following, in co-operation with airplanes and gunboats. The Levies numbered on hundred and twenty. It was pitch dark, and the route lay across country. Men fell into deep ditches, and one man went, horse and all, down a well. There was a lake, two and a half miles wide, between the troops and their objective, and fifty men were sent across it in bellums (a large native rowing boat), the remainder, one man to two horses, swimming and wading further down. Orders were to remain near and in observation of the village while it was bombed and shelled, but they were not to attack unless Sheikh Badr was seen evacuating it. Therefore they remained in observation for the whole of the 26th; but pushed in and occupied the place on the 27th. On May 8th thirty Levies under Captain Lewis were sent to deal with bad characters in the marsh village of Umm-el Batouch. They were transported to the island on which the village stands, on rafts, and rushed it at dawn. Five of the enemy were killed and one captured. The Levy guide was killed. On May 21st the 5th Euphrates Levy were out again, forming part of a column to deal with Sheikh Badrs force, which had concentrated on the west bank of the Sharaish River. Captain Hall was again in command of the mounted troops. They marched at 11.45 p.m. on May 21st, forded the river opposite Fathi Fort, with orders to work round the north-east side of the enemy position, and to attack while the main position was bombed with airplanes. They were not to cross the Sharaish River until after the aeroplane bombardment. For some time therefore the Levies were engaged at about 900 yards with the enemy, who had advanced to the river. As soon as the bombardment ceased, they crossed, attacked, and dispersed the enemy, and burnt Badrs village and crops. The column then withdrew, the Levies protecting its rear and right flank. On the same date matters came to a head in Sulaimani. After a long period during which matters were getting more and more difficult, Sheikh Mahmud, who will appear very frequently later, advanced from Barzinjah on Sulaimani. He met the Levies under Major F.S.Greenhouse on May 22nd at the Azmir Dagh, overwhelmed them and captured the town. A force in armored cars and Fords, attempting to relieve it, was caught, and defeated with some loss in Tasluja Pass, and a very threatening situation was only brought to an end by the defeat and capture of Sheikh Mahmud in the engagement in the Bazian Pass by Major-General Sir T. Fraser, K.C.B., C.S.I, C.M.G, G.O.C., 18th Division, on the 17th June. The Amadiyah area was the next area of disturbance. In June the troops about Amadiyah were withdrawn to Suwara Tuka Pass, eighteen miles southwest of Amadiyah. The A.P.O., Captain Willey, was left in Amadiyah, with Lieut. McDonald and Sergeant Troop in command of Kurdish Levies. Anti-British and anti-Christian propaganda had been going on for some time, and on July 15th, the leaders of this movement, aided by contingents of Kurdish tribesmen and the local gendarmerie, murdered the whole party. A column at once took action under General Nightingale, and with it two Battalions of Assyrians trained in Baqubah. They entered Amadiyah on August 8th and then took action against the Barwari tribes, the Goyan and Guli. The Assyrian Battalions did well on this expedition, and this led later to their being taken as the main part of the Iraq Levies. Operations concluded in September. Unrest in the North now extended to the Rowanduz area, where a small party of Police, with the Civil Officials, was surrounded. Captain C.E.Littledale left Arbil to attempt the relief of the place, having with him only fifteen mounted, thirty-two dismounted gendarmes and thirty dismounted Levies. He marched via Shaklawa, on Batas; and there is no doubt that in addition to the great difficulties of the expedition he was met by treachery on all sides.   Near Batas his force was attacked, and, the whole country being now hostile, he was obliged to retreat on Arbil, being fired on from all villages passed en route. He only brought back thirty-one of his force out of seventy-seven. In November, the Political Officer, Mosul, Mr.J.H.H.Bill, I.C.S, and the Assistant Political Officer, Aqra, Captain K.R.Scott, M.C., were attacked and killed by Kurds of Zibar and Barzan near Bira Kapra. The Kurds then attacked Aqra, which was held by Lieut. Barlow and some gendarmerie. They put up a good fight; but had to retire. The Yuzbashi (native captain) Hasoon Ibn Falayfil, who later was awarded the medal of gallantry, rallied a small party at Jujar; and by holding on here blocked the road to Mosul from the insurgents, and gave support to such Kurdish chiefs as remained loyal to the Government. He held on until relieved, and his action enabled the country up to the Aqra Dagh to be re-occupied. In the Deir-ez-Zor area, unrest had been continuing for some time. Already two Officers, Captain Chamier, Political Officer, Deir-ez-Zor, and Lieut. Mills of the 6th L.A.M. Battery, had been ambushed on the road. On December the 10th matters came to a head, and the place was invested by some two thousand Arabs, supplemented by the rabble from the town. There were only sixty levies available for defense; they were driven from the Government offices to the barracks, where there was no food or water, and made their escape by twos and threes, or became casualties until only twenty remained The Political Officer agreed to evacuate the town on December 11th. The Levies were given 60 mll. Pay and dismissed. Just as the year closed twenty-four men of the 4th Euphrates Levy attempted to collect rifles in the Samawa area, but they met overwhelming numbers, and had to retire, losing three killed, one wounded and eight horses. It is interesting to note that while the Levy Force was improving in strength and training, and carrying out the work described above, that a statement was made in Parliament that local Levies were not being raised and trained in Mesopotamia.     CHAPTER II 1920 - 1921   THIS year, 1920, opened with changes in the control and organization of the Levies. One point of contention was the Sulaimani Levy. After the defeat and capture of Sheikh Mahmud at the action of the Bazian Pass, Major E.B.Soane took over the area, and made it during his period of rule the quietest in Iraq. He was a strong character and difficult to deal with, and hence came the arrangement about the Sulaimani Levy, that Major Soane controlled its strength and use, while the Inspector-General was responsible only for equipping it. In March there was a new arrangement made which came into effect on April 1st. The force had been already, in September 1919, divided into two parts: (i) Striking Force, (ii) Police-both composed of mounted and dismounted troops.   This Striking Force was to be considered an armed Reserve at the disposal of Political Officers, under the same conditions as laid down in the Memorandum of August 12th. The Police were to carry out the duties hitherto done by the whole Levy Force. By a slight change in organization the total Levy Force now was:- 24 Squadrons of 115. Total 2,760. 17and half Companies of 115. Total 2,012   And in accordance with the above arrangement were divided as follows:- (a) Striking Force - 19 Squadrons. - 7 and half Companies. (b) Police -4 Squadrons. -7 Companies. One squadron and the two companies of the Sulaimani Levy were left undefined, probably some special arrangement being made between the Inspecting Officer and the Political Officer. Pay and allowances ere dealt with at this time. Proficiency pay was fixed at 5 Rupees a month. Rations for men was fixed at 15 Rupees, and for horses at 25 Rupees. Training of the mounted troops was to be definitely as mounted infantry. These arrangements had just been completed when the Arab Rebellion broke out. This was a most trying time for the Levies, who remained faithful to the Government throughout the rebellion. They had to face the worst forms of persecution to induce them to change sides. Intensive propaganda was leveled at them by their own people, including their female relations. They were openly insulted in the streets and coffee shops, and called infidels. Reports were circulated to them that their own women, whom they had left in their homes, were being assaulted, or in some cases carried off and killed. They fully realized they were cutting themselves off from their own people. The two indecisive actions of Mahmudiyeh and ibn Ali were exaggerated into Arab victories. The Manchester Column disaster occurred in the middle of the country from which the 2nd Euphrates Levy were drawn. Parties of Levies who were besieged in Rowanduz, Diwaniyeh, Abu Sukhair, Kufa, Hillah, Khidr, and Nasiriyeh, were called to by name by the rebels, to come out and protect their own homes and relations. In spite of all these trials, desertion were very few. Active operations began on the night of May 13/14th, when one hundred men of the 3rd Tigris Levy with one hundred Amarah and one hundred Qurnah tribesmen, made a successful night raid on the Bait Jasim and Bait Mahmud of the Nawafh, at Al Baidah in the marshes. On the 30th June fifty Levies mounted on horses, lent by the Sheikh of Dulaim, were attacked while reconnoitering Mahmudiyeh, by a superior force of the enemy. The horses stampeded, and the force fell back, losing five killed and eight wounded. From July 3rd-6th a body of sixty Levies accompanied a column operating about Imam Hamza, and made raids on villages round. There were twenty-six mounted and twenty dismounted Levies holding Imam Hamza, the railway station there, and Nabi Madiyan, and these had daily skirmishes with the rebels. On July 9th Captain Priestly-Evans and sixty Levies were attacked at Kahn Jadwal. They made a successful defense; but Captain Priestly-Evans and ten men were killed and twelve were wounded. They inflicted one hundred casualties on their opponents. Three days later a party of sixty Levies were surprised on the railway and dispersed. From July 14th-18th a small detachment of the 2nd Euphrates Levy was besieged in Abu Sukhair. The besiegers succeeded in getting into a house, where the women and children of the Levies were, and these were only rescued with difficulty. Arrangements were made to evacuate the place, and on July 18th the besieged garrison was withdrawn to Kufa. In Kufa was a squadron of the 2nd Euphrates Levy, commanded by Lieut. F.J.McWhinnie and Lieut. Matthews. They formed part of the garrison and stood a ninety day siege, in which they were reduced to eating the mules. The Levies lot five killed and fifteen wounded in the siege. In the Hillah area Levies were engaged during the whole of July and August in patrol actions with the rebels.   On August 1st three troops of Levies holding Bab el Maslakh were attacked. They were forced to retire, but did so in good order, and the enemy lost heavily. A detachment of the Indian Army and seventy men of the Euphrates Levy under Lieuts. Davies and Simpson had been holding Ain and Khidr from the 2nd July until 12th August, assisted by an armored train on the railway, and two boats on the river, which was too low at this time of year to allow the boats near enough to get a good target for their guns. Up to August 12th the work of the Levies had been confined to patrolling; but about that date a large concentration of Arabs was reported, and they were ordered to evacuate Ain and Khidr, and go to Ur. On the night of August 12/13th firing began, and went on all night. In the morning the armored train moved out; but met a large body of the enemy marching on Ain village, and returned to Khidr. The town was then surrounded. The whole garrison was soon engaged, and many horses were hit. Another armored train managed to get in from Ur, and the evacuation of the town began. Horses and stores were entrained, and all shunting done under heavy fire, and there was no railway officials to superintend. Directly the trains began to move, the rebels swarmed down towards the station year. Three trains in all were dispatched, the one in rear fighting a rear-guard action. At Alu Risha one train ran into the rear of the other, and three trucks were telescoped and the line blocked. Fire was poured into the train from all round. The rear train had to be evacuated; being the wrong side of the telescoped trucks, and all the personnel on it was transferred to the front train. Ur was eventually reached. The Levies lost eight and the Indian Army twenty, killed and missing. Fifty-nine horses were lost, and a quantity of material. Lieut. Simpson received the M.B.E. for his good work in this action. The official account of this action draws particular attention to the continuous and exhausting outpost work done by this small Levy detachment, and points out the success with which they carried it out.   On the 14th August the Diala Levy from Shahraban marched out, and relieved a military train held up by rebels. Next day they were attacked on all sides, ammunition ran out, and the enemy rushed Shahraban. Captain J.T.Bradfield, commanding the post, Sergeant-Major Newton and 35 other ranks were killed, 12 reported missing, and 15 captured. On the 10th September the -A- squadron, 2nd Euphrates Levy, were attached to the 5th Cavalry for operations on the right bank of the Euphrates in the 53rd Brigade Group. On the 11th this column advanced on Sadr Tomaznah, burning villages as they went, and on the 12th the force was divided into two columns, the -A- Squadron, 2nd Euphrates Levy, forming advanced guard to the right column. The objective was the Khawas Canal. Patrols of the Levies went forward at a gallop, and forestalled the rebels by a few minutes. The next objective was Tuwairij, the Levy Squadron now becoming right flank guard. They took the village of Beit Salman Musa at a gallop. The enemy counter-attacked, and the squadron held them off until relieved by a company of the 13th Rajputs. As soon as they were relieved they were ordered to take a hill, 1,000 yards west of Beit Salman Musa. They galloped to the foot of the hill, dismounted, and drove the enemy off, inflicting several casualties as they went. They followed this up by a series of mounted advances to successive position, until they reached their final objective, the Taijiyah Canal. During August the disturbances spread to the North. This was not so much part of the Arab Rebellion in the South, which did not affect the Kurds, as a pro-Turkish agitation started in and about Arbil. Captain C.E.Littledale commanded the Levies in Arbil and was obliged to evacuate both Rowanduz and Batas with considerable loss. The Kurdish Levies remained absolutely loyal during this difficult period. Captain Littledale gained the Military Cross for his work. Turning to the South again, the rebellion was gradually being crushed. On October 3rd the 2nd Tigris Levy, under command of Captain Bevan, (Captain Bevan was accidentally killed later whilst on leave) surrounded a rebel named Amin Beg in a fort at Badrah, and after a fight in which bombs were used, they captured him. Levies were also engaged in other areas during the whole of October, and took part in successful actions against the rebels on the 19th and 30th of the month. During November and December -A & C- Squadrons, 2nd Euphrates Levy, operated in the Hillah area, and were almost continuously on the move. They were in action on 11th, 18th and 23rd November. On December 13th -C- Squadron moved to Diwaniyeh, and for the rest of the month, the whole of January and into February 1921, they and -B- Squadron of the same Regiment were engaged on operations, with columns in the Diwaniyeh area. Throughout this periods of the Rebellion the Levies lost seventy-three killed in action, and gained fifteen medals for gallantry. General A.G. Wauchop, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., left about the end of 1920, and gave on leaving a cup, still held at Levy Headquarters as a Shooting Cup. He had inspected Levies from time to time during his period of command of a Brigade in that country.   CHAPTER III 1921   EARLY in 1921 was held the Cairo Conference on Iraq, and from the decisions taken there, the future of the Iraq Levies was decided, and laid down by orders from the British Cabinet shortly as follows:-   The function of the Iraq Levies, as determined at the Cairo Conference, is to relieve the British and Indian Troops in Iraq, take over out-posts in Mosul vilayet and in Kurdistan, previously held by the Imperial Garrison, and generally to fill the gap until such time as the Iraq National Army is trained to undertake there duties. So far the Levies had consisted entirely of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans. Now that the Iraq Army was to be formed , the Arabs would be required to join it rather than to go to Levies. It was decided to enlist Assyrians in the Levies. Apart from their work already described on the Guli and Amadiyah operations they had shown good fighting qualities on the following occasions. In September 1919, when the Assyrian Repatriation Camp at Mindan, about thirty miles north-east Mosul, was attacked by Kurds, the Assyrians though greatly outnumbered beat off the attack, and with a loss to themselves of four killed and eight wounded, inflicted a loss of sixty killed on their opponents, and drove them over the Zab, where many were drowned. In July 1920, when a body of Arab rebels attacked Baqubah Camp, the Assyrians not only beat off the attack, but also took the offensive, making the attackers pay very dearly for their attempt. Later in the year occurred the abortive attempt to repatriate the Assyrians in Hakkiari. This has been described in detail by other writers; but, suffice to say, that a body of these people attempted to march back and occupy their country led by Agha Petros, and Assyrian leader. They went late in 1920, and the only result was a lot of fighting with the Kurds, in which the Assyrians certainly gave back something of what they had had in previous years and showed their fighting qualities. This affair was a fiasco and they returned to Iraq. This left an unsolved problem; but also showed that a very useful crowd of good fighting men were ready at hand with nothing to occupy the. It was therefore decided to start enlisting them for the Levies.   The beginning of the enlistment of Assyrians was made at Mindan Camp. Already a memorandum had been circulated asking for officers. On April 17th Major-General G.A.F.Sanders, C.B., C.M.G., interviewed the following Officers of the Indian Army, who had decided to undertake this work. They were Captains H.McNearnie, R.G.Ardrib, J.F.Knowles. E. ST. J.Hebberd and R.Merry. Arrangements for pay and terms of service were arranged, and on April 19th , This party arrived at Mosul, and reported to Colonel L.F.Nalder, C.I.E., C.B.E. the Political Officer there. There were joined by Dr,W.A.Wigram there, and on the 20th the whole party went to Mindan Camp. However, the attempts to enlist men were not successful. Many recruiting meetings were held, but the men would not come forward. The leading men were interviewed, but only made objections. All they wanted was that the British should send them back to their country, which they had lost through joining the Allies. After a great expenditure of eloquence by DR. Wigram, and a good deal of action by the British Officers, some fifty men were got together and they, at the last minute, tried to get out of it, but were stopped. The British personnel decided to hold on to what they had, and to prevent the men they had getting away to the camp again; Captain Hebberd with ten men and their families went off to Aqra; Captains Merry and Ardron with the rest went to a camp at Nebi Yunis, close to Mosul. Captains McNerarnie and Knowles stayed at Mindan to recruit and forward men to Aqra and Mosul. Colonel Nalder at Mosul fitted the force out with tents, and through him the ration contracts were made. Clothing, arms and S.A.A. were drawn from the Police. Early in June, by recruiting locally and by drafts from Mindan, the force rose to about 250 at Mosul, and was organized as No. 8 and No. 9 Companies. The British Officers selected and appointed the Native Officers and N.C.O.s,and of these many proved to be failures and were broken at once. All those picked to be officers, in any case did a period as N.C.O.s, The first Native Officer appointed was Rab-Khamshi Usuf Yokhana, who became Signaling Officer of the 1st Assyrian Battalion; and on about the same date, Daniel Ismail, son of Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiari Assyrians, was made an officer at Aqra, and is now Rab-Tremma of the 2nd Assyrian Battalion. The next two chosen were Yakub Ismail, another son of Malik Ismail, and Shimoel Tiya, the former became Rab-Tremma, the latter Rab-Emma in the 1st Assyrian Battalion. Both were made in Mosul. At the end of May No. 8 Company under Captain Ardron, and No. 9 Company under Captain Merry left Mosul for Dohuk. They were escorted by two troops of the 7th Hussars. This, their first appearance on the march, was not impressive. They were badly equipped and clothed, and with their families hanging on to them, made a poor show. They remained at Dohuk for some three months. Another Company No. 7 under Captain W.H.Crawford Clarke, M.C., joined them there. The situation being on August 22nd No.5 Company (Hebberd) and No.6 Company (Moody) at Aqra and No. 7 Company (Crawford Clarke), No. 8 Company (Baddiley vice Ardron) and No. 9 Company (Merry) at Dohuk. All these companies were Assyrians except No. 7, which was half Kurd and half Assyrians. In July Colonel-Commandant Sanders left the country, handing over the Levy administration to Colonel-Commandant Frith.   Lieut-Colonel C.R.Barke, C.B.E., T.D., took over command of the Levies in the Mosul area on August 20th, from Captain H.D.McNearnie, to whom is due much of the credit for the successful raising and organization of the Assyrian Levies. At this date the Headquarters 18th Indian Division (General Fraser) and 54th Brigade (General Nightingale) were still in Mosul. The A.D.M.S. of this Division dealt with the Levies in Medical and sanitary matters. Lieut-Colonel Barke carried out inspections of the companies at Dohuk on August 24th and at Aqra on August 27th. On August 22nd the 5th Levy Cavalry Regiment came to Mosul; this was preparatory to taking over duties hitherto carried out by the Indian Army. On September 10th the relief of the Imperial Garrisons began. Two squadrons, 5th Levy Cavalry Regiment, under Captain C.O.L. Devenish, left Mosul for Dohuk; the rest of the Regiment left Mosul on September 12th and went to Tel Afar, where they took over from the Imperial Garrison there, which was one squadron 8th Hussars, one section R.F.A. and one company 3/70th Burma Rifles.   Arrangements were rather interfered with by trouble with the Surchi Kurds, and from September 11th-14th No. 5 Company were away from Aqra at Kelaiti, co-operating with the gendarmerie, who were operating against Sheikh Obedullah of Bajeel, in the Dasht-I-Harir. The Royal Air Force took action also. The Levies had no fighting and returned on September 14th. The next relief of Imperial troops was at Zakho. No. 8 and 9 Companies left Dohuk and took over there from the 3/70th Burma Riffles. Captain Merry became O.C. Station with Lieut. P.J.T.Baddiley and Captain A.C.Prevett, Officers Commanding Companies. The mixed No. 7 Company, half Assyrian and half Kurd, and other Moslem races proved unsatisfactory. There had been trouble on the road up, and at Dohuk there was still more. After investigation the company was broken up, the Assyrians were sent to Aqra, and Captain Crawford Clarke took the rest off by kellek (A raft supported on inflated skins) from Mosul for Baghdad in November. In the middle of September Brigadier-General L.W.de V. Sadleir-Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., took over the command of the Levies, from Colonel Commandant Frith. Orders regarding training were issued, and instructors were to be detailed from the Army. Lieut-Colonel Barke started equitation courses under the 30th Lancers, and drill and musketry courses were commenced under the 2nd Bn.East Yorkshire Regiment during October; these were all going well by the end of the month. During the month the Levies received in equipment, one thousand rifles from Baghdad, and winter clothing. Medical arrangements also began to take shape. Captain J.W.Malcolm, O.B.E., M.C., R.A.M.C., and Assistant-Surgeon C.L.Smith arrived at Mosul, to start Levy medical arrangements, although for some time the Director of Health Services (Civil) had the responsibility of levy health matters.   The strength of the force on October 1st had been 21 Squadrons, 10 Companies and 2 Batteries. The Inspector-General decided on a complete reorganization, which had already been partly put in train on paper; there-fore from a somewhat disorganized force of odd units the force became 4 Cavalry Regiments, 1 Pack Battery, 2 Battalions Infantry, and 3 Machine Gun Companies. General Sadleir-Jackson decided also to equip the force with automatic weapons, and Lewis and Hotchkiss guns were orders. Although Levy Headquarters were in Baghdad, the Levy details Camp at Nineveh still received and checked stores, and passed personnel through. Sergeant-Major Higgins remained in command. The 18th Division left Mosul on October 15th. The location and strength of the Levies at the end of 1921 was:-   MOSUL AREA. Zakho- 2 Companies 2nd Battalion. Aqra- 2 Companies 2nd Battalion Dohuk- H.Q. 5th Regiment (less 2 Squadrons)and H.Q. 2nd Battalion (less 4 Companies). Tel Afar- 2 Squadrons 5th Regiment.   SOUTH KURDISTAN. Arbil- 4th Regiment. Kirkuk- 2nd Regiment. Sulaimani- One Squadron Sulaimani Levy and One Company Sulaimani (Infantry). Rania- One Platoon Sulaimani infantry. Chemchemal- half Company Sulaimani infantry Halebja- One Platoon Sulaimani infantry Khanaqin- 3rd Regiment Sulaimani infantry   EUPHRATES. Diwaniyeh- 1st Regiment (less I Troops). Samawah- 1st Battalion (less 2 Companies and 2 Platoons). Rumaithah- 1 Platoon 1st Battalion. Nasiriyeh- 2 Companies 1st Battalion. Baghdad- 1 Troop 1st Regiment and 1 Platoon 1st Battalion.   Total strength was :- Mounted Troops- 2,203. Infantry- 2,051.   Since early in the year the Levies had not been actively engaged except for a very small affair of shooting at Dohuk, in which the 7th Company were involved, on the night of October 4th. One December 14th, however, the Arab Levy Cavalry under Lieut. H.E.Bois, acting as escort to the Assistant Political Officer, were attacked by Kurds near Babachikchek. Lieut. Bois was wounded, and nine men and horses were killed, and the force had to retreat. General Sadleir-Jackson issued orders for operations against the Kurds on the 16th December; a Cavalry Column some 7-800 strong to concentrate at Arbil under his own command, and to march via Shaklawa on Batas, and an Infantry Column from Aqra under Lieut-Colonel Barke, to march on Batas via Kandil, and co-operate with the cavalry. The concentration produced some hard marching. A squadron of the 5th Levy Cavalry Regiment, for instance, left Dohuk on December 18th and picking up another squadron under Captain J.P.Carvosso of the same Regiment, which marched from Tel Afar, arrived at Arbil on December 22nd, doing 110 miles in all. At 18.00 on December 25th the Cavalry Column left Arbil under General Sadleir-Jackson, Captain Devenish following at 06.00 next day with the ration convoy. The Cavalry Column reached Sisawa on December 26th, and found the Kurds in occupation of Harir and Batas villages. To return to the column under Lieut-Colonel Barke, which advanced from Aqra. He had sent forward one platoon, and with it an Arab Kellekchi, with the necessary skins and poles for making kelleks. Captain McNearnie was in command. This advanced party reached Isteria village on December 24th, and began the construction of the raft. They came under fire at once from the opposite bank. The rest of the Infantry Column under Lieut-Colonel Barke was at Bajil on December 24th. At 15.00 on December 25th, they reached Isteria, and found McNearnies party engaged with Kurds on the opposite bank, and all raft making stopped by the fire. Rab-Khamshi Polus Elias had been wounded. During the night the raft was completed. At 06.30 on December 26th the first raft load of fifty men was send across covered by rifle fire and the fire of one machine-gun worked by Sergeant-Major Hillier, who had just brought it up to the Mosul area for instructional purposes. The party came under heavy fire in crossing, but succeeded, and the enemy force, which contained some Turkish soldiers from Rowanduz, retired. The crossing was completed at 11.00. At 11.30 two aeroplanes of No. 55 Squadron appeared. One landed and crashed in trying to take off again. The pilot was taken off by the other, while the mechanic of the crashed aeroplane with his Lewis Gun, joined the column. Barkes Column halted at Khorra near Kandil. On December 27th they burned Khorra, and advanced on Batas, arriving at a point one mile east of it at 11.05. Meantime the Cavalry Column advanced from Sisawa, and attacked Harir. Here they met a determined resistance, and by about 11.00 they were definitely held up. The fight went on all day and by the evening Captain Carvosso and five of his men had been killed. Lieut. R.A.Burridge was mortally wounded next morning. No orders came to Barke, who then attacked Batas. This was done at 12.45 with air support, and at 13.40 the village was occupied by Captain E. St. J.Hebberd with the loss of two men wounded. Very heavy rain now began. The Cavalry Column was still about Sisawa, with two squadrons holding a strong outpost line near Harir. At 17.00, Captain Devenish, who had just arrived with the convoy, was ordered to march with the convoy escort, as soon as the men had had a meal, to attack the Harir Dagh under cover of darkness. He left his horses at Sisawa, and marched at 17.30, got partly up the Dagh in the dark, and then became stuck in the rain and darkness. On December 28th the action was renewed. Devenish moved on up the Dagh, as soon as he could see, captured one Kurd on the way up, and near the top came into action. A squadron of the 3rd Regiment followed him, and the Kurds withdrew. He reached the top at 08.00, pushed along the Harir Dagh, to a point above Batas, and here took up a position and built sangars. Several small parties of enemy were seen, but did not come near, and made off when fired at.   In the morning Barkes Column started from Batas to join the Cavalry Column at Harir. The rear guard was hotly attacked as it left by Kurds pressing on through the gardens. R.T.Daniel Ismail commanding the rear-guard, counter-attacked, bringing back seven rifles and one sword. At 15.00 General Sadleir-Jackson, finding it impossible to obtain air co-operation owing to the inclement weather, ordered Barke to attack Harir. This was done in co-operation with Captain Littledale and the Police with a loss of two killed, one died of wounds, and one wounded. The town was burnt. This ended the operation. On the morning of the 29th December Devenish, who had spent the night in the snow on top of the Harir Dagh, sent patrols out but found nothing. The columns all concentrated at Sisawa, and left for Shaklawa. Captain Devenish and Lieut. D.S.Foster followed with their party from Harir, half a company of Assyrians from Barkes Column holding Sisawa until they arrived. The whole force was back at Arbil by December 31st.     CHAPTER IV 1922   ON 17th January, 1922, the Levies were placed under G.O.C.-in-C. Military Forces, except for finance and administration. The strength and organization of the force was fixed, after discussion, at:- 3 Regiments of Cavalry. 4 Battalions of Infantry. 1 Machine-Gun Company. 2 Pack Batteries.   The Cavalry had no automatic weapons. The Infantry Battalions did not get Lewis guns until July. Up to this date there had been four Regiments of Cavalry, the reduction from five to four having been just effected. Now another had to go, and to bring this about the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments were amalgamated, and re-named the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, while the 4th became the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. In May 1922, the strength of the force was:- Cavalry, 1,410 - a Regiment was 457. Infantry, 3,248 - a Battalion was 701. Battery, 210. Depot, 173.   Vickers guns were at this time held with Battalions; but a change was being effected, and a Machine-Gun Company formed. In budgeting for this force, the yearly cost of one squadron was 157,728 Rupees and of a Company 170,928 Rupees. After the action at Batas, General Sadleir-Jackson ordered the enlistment of 1,500 more Assyrians for the Levies. This enlistment began on January 7th. No. 6 Company (Captain Moody) went from Aqra to Dohuk to form a nucleus, and to assist in training new recruits. Captain McWhinnie was transferred from the Euphrates area to Aqra, to raise an Assyrian Company there. Lieut-Colonel Barke proceeded to Dohuk at once and the enlistment of Assyrians was carried out, partly by a party consisting of Lieut-Colonel Barke, David De Mar Shimon, the father of the Patriarch, and Rab-Emma Daniel Ismail, son of Malik Ismail, and the senior Assyrian Officer of the Levies, and partly by Captain McNearnie, who had previously been so successful in raising the original companies, making extensive recruiting tours through Kurdistan, particularly the Amadiya area and north of it, where there were many settled Assyrians. The first party interviewed Mr. R.F.Jardine, the Administrative Inspector, and the rest of Assyrian Maliks, but the results were not entirely satisfactory. One particular case being that the Bohtanis, who were asked for men; the men selected sold their crops and came down to enlist and were then told they were not required. Fifty men of the Assyrian Companies at Zakho and Aqra were also selected for training for the Pack Battery. Guns were obtained from the Army at Mosul and on February 1st Captain Devenish left with this party by kellek, from Mosul to Baghdad. A further party of one Assyrian Officer, and fifty Other Ranks, was send from Mosul to Kirkuk, to be trained as machine-gunners at the Machine-Gun School there under Lieut. Simpson, assisted by a staff of B.N.C.O.s. Courses were also arranged in (a) Bugling, eight men, (b) Kellek making, ten men; this was very necessary for operations in the hills, and (c) Carrier Pigeon Work, one man. Eight instructors, four in drill and four in musketry, were sent from the 2nd Bn. East Yorkshire Regiment to the camp at Dohuk. On February 26th Lieut. J.B.F.Austin, 7th Hussars, arrived at Mosul with W/T personnel. He took over a pack W/T set from the R.A.F. and proceeded to Dohuk. By the beginning of March training in the camp at Dohuk was going well. A report, of the date, says that the musketry of the Levies was better than their drill. In spite of certain setbacks, recruits were coming in well. McNearnies recruiting trip had been very successful, and by the middle of March some twelve hundred recruits and families were assembled at Dohuk. Captain Prevett was at this time a command of Dohuk, with Captains B.C. Moodry and H.A.Foweraker as Officers Commanding Companies. As the present site was very cramped and within the range of snipers from the adjacent hills, Dohuk Camp was moved to Dulip at the end of March. On March 14th General Sadleir-Jackson handed over the command of the Levies to Colonel G.R.Frith. A further re-organization of the command took place in April. Levy areas were abolished. Mosul Area ceased to exist on April 12th, and the next day Lieut-Colonel Barke went to Dulip and took over command of the battalion there. He had under him Captains Prevett, Moody, Young, Baddiley, and Flowerier. The latter was in command of a new company which was forming. There were also eight British N.C.O. instructors from the East Yorkshire Regiment, one N.C.O. send by Mosul District for physical training and one W/T set. In addition there were twelve hundred recruits and fifteen hundred women and children in the camp. The units under his command in Dulip Camp were 2nd Battalion Headquarters and two companies, the other companies being at Zakho. The 3rd Battalion with two companies at Dulip and two at Aqra. At this time battalions had companies of 240 but no headquarters wing. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment was also at Dulip. The latter consisted of three squadrons of Kurds and was under the command of Major E.N.Eveleigh, D.S.O., M.C. It was decided to form an Assyrian Squadron in this Regiment, and Lieut-Colonel Barke transferred a certain number of his men to the Regiment for the purpose. This was done partly to take the place of Arab personnel of the Levies, as all Arabs in the country were now required for the Iraq Army. Orders were issued that no more Arabs were to be enlisted, and that those already in the Levies were not to be taken on as their time expired. Barke commanded both battalions at Dulip until the arrival of Major Bentinck. Prevett was appointed adjutant of the 3rd Battalion and Moody acted as adjutant of the 2nd Battalion. It will be readily understood, especially by those who remember the initial stages of the raising of the New Army in 1914, that the raising and formation of these battalions was not accomplished without difficulties being met with and the occurrence of the occasional hitch. Whilst a certain number of Assyrian N.C.Os were sent from the companies which were raised nine months previously, the bulk of the A.O.s had to be selected and appointed from the twelve hundred recruits recently joined. At that time there were few of them with much knowledge of English and the B.Os and B.N.C.O. instructors had no knowledge of Syriac. In spite of all difficulties the British Officers and N.C.Os worked hard at the training and General Nightingale visited the camp from time to time and encouraged everyones efforts. There occurred a delay in the issue of clothing, equipment and tentage; a considerable portion had been obtained from the Army Ordnance Depot at Mosul, just before it closed down in January; the remainder had to be obtained from Baghdad and through some misunderstanding was very late in arrival. In March the recruits in camp at Dohuk, numbering between two and three thousand, could not be clothed and equipped immediately, became restive and desired to go back. Barke had to address them and assure them that he had seen their clothing in large boxes being loaded on to camels at rail-head (Shergat) and that it would arrive shortly. In June the 2nd Cavalry Regiment came down from Dulip to Nineveh Camp, the building of which had been completed by Captain W.E.Parnell. The Squadron of Assyrians were formed, under Rab-Emma Shain Gewergis, and put under training. Meantime Dulip Camp had proved most unhealthy. Malaria began at the end of May and by August practically every British Officer and British N.C.O. had been attacked and also some seventy per cent of the Assyrians. The G.O.C. (General Fraser) visited the camp and inspected all the troops and issued orders for the 3rd Battalion (Barkes), less the two companies at Aqra, to move to Mindan. This was due to an attack being expected on Erbil by the Kurds and Turks. The column left Dulip on 13th July and reached Mindan on the 16th. Several of the party could not march owing to malaria. There were no water-bottles, and water had to be carried in chagals, purchased out of P.R.I. funds. One hundred and ten camels had to be hired to convey baggage and S.A.A. On arrival of Mindan, signalers lent by the 11th Rajputs established communication with Mosul from the top of Jebel Maglub. After G.H.O. had taken over the Levies, as a result of a conference, the pay of 50 Rupees a month promised to recruits by McNearnie, as he was authorized to do on his recruiting tour, was changed to 45 Rupees a month. This was, in effect, a breach of faith. The only thing the Battalion Commanders could do was to call up the Assyrian Officers, tell them of the decision of G.H.O., and tell them to inform men. As it happened, nothing went wrong, and the men accepted the situation without comment. But it was realized that by 1923 owing to the refusal of the Assyrians to re-engage that the Assyrian units would cease to exist by the spring of that year. A conference was held at Dohuk under the Colonel-Commandant in the autumn of 1922 when more favorable terms were offered and the Maliks asked to co-operate. At first an indecisive situation was the result, but finally the Patriarchal family threw their influence into the raising of recruits and re-enlistments. David De Mar Shimon, father of the Patriarch, became an Officer in the Levies and as a result of his efforts, together with those of the other recruiting parties, practically all serving Assyrians re-enlisted and sufficient number of new recruits was raised to save the whole situation. Since then no trouble has ever been found to raise recruits. In January the first contingent of the Iraq Army arrived in Mosul. They were played in by the band of the East Yorkshire Regiment. Another battalion of the Indian Army, the 15th Sikhs, left at the same time. Arrangements were made at once for the Iraq Army to take over Tel Afar from the Levies. In June, General Nightingale left. His departure was much regretted by all the Levies, whom he had helped greatly. He had had contingents out from time to time, and reported well on the. On July 7th the old Euphrates Levy head Quarters closed down; they had been on the right bank of the Tigris at Baghdad, in the lines occupied later by the 1st Marsh Arab Battalion of the Levies. In October the Royal Air Force took over from the Army. This had been decided on at the Cairo Conference, and as this forms a definite land-mark in the history of the Levies, as well as of Iraq, the operations they were engaged in from the beginning of 1922 to this date will not be described. In January the Sulaimani levy carried out operations against the Avroman Kurds, helped by some of the Jaf near Halebja. In action at Kurmal, Captain H.C.D.FitzGibbon, 13th Hussars, serving with the Levies, was killed in action. In the Northern Area matters were quiet at the start of the year, through there was some anxiety about the Kurds attacking Aqra in February. This came to nothing. In May and June, General Nightingale carried out operations against the Kurds in the North-Eastern Area. At Baneh Banok, north of Halebja, and action was fought in which Lieut. V.T.Mott and four Other Ranks of the Levies were killed. These operations were hardly over when trouble began in the Chemchemal area. Already at Jabbari on May 21st, the Mudir had been attacked and wounded by Sayid Muhammed Jabbari and his escort deprived of horses and arms. The Begzada Section of the Hamawand were restive at the curtailment of their privileges; Kerim Futteh Beg, their leading spirit, openly threatened rebellion. Propaganda for the return of Sheikh Mahmud was continuous, and having its effect. On June 12th the Political Officer asked for a Levy Force to proceed to Tainal. On June 16th it arrived, consisting of the Sulaimani Levy Battalion of three un mounted and one mounted companies, and one section of Assyrian machine-gunners, from the Machine-Gun School at Kirkuk, all commanded by Lieut-Colonel E.C.T.Minet, D.S.O., M.C. (Reserve of Officers), Iraq Levies. On June 17th the principal headmen were summoned and interviewed by Captain S.S.Bond, the Assistant Political Officer. Kerim Futteh Beg then wrote professing loyalty, asked why the military had come, and offered to meet Captain Bond at Mortaka. On June 18th Captain Bon, accompanied by Captain R.K.Makant, who was about to transfer from the Levies to the Political side, and was to succeed Captain Bond at Chemchemal, proceeded to Mortaka. They were met by Kerim Futteh Beg two miles from the village. As they rode in with him both officers were shot in the back, it is said by Saber and Abdullah, sons of Kerim Futteh Beg, and killed instantly. Colonel Minet recovered the bodies and buried them the same day and at once took action to hunt down Kerim Futteh Beg and his band. The 1st Levy Cavalry Regiment joined him from Kirkuk, its place being taken by a squadron of the 3rd Levy Cavalry Regiment, and for the next month, Minet carried out a vigorous hunt after Kerim Futteh Beg, beginning in the Chemchemal area, thence to the Daiala River in Sangaw, and from there northwards to the Surdash valley. Another squadron of the 3rd Levy Cavalry moved up from Khanaqin to Maidan on the 20th to assist in the operations. On July 23rd came news, premature as it happened, that Kerim Futteh Beg had crossed the Lesser Zab at Dukhan. Minet started in pursuit at once and arrived at Durband on July 27th, the Headquarters of the Assistant Political Officer, Rania, Mr. Edmonds. Further trouble had begun in this area. The Pizhdar tribe had been of some time in a state of disaffection. Moreover on June 23rd a Turkish officer named Euz Demir, with a party of Officers, had arrived in Rowanduz, with a special mission of stirring up tribal revolt by Pan-Islamic propaganda, and presents of ammunition and the like. By July 10th the situation was such in Rowanduz, that it was bombed by a concentration of aeroplanes on July 10th,11th,18th and at intervals later. On July 29th Colonel Minet moved his force to Qala Diza, accompanied by the Assistant Political Officer. No action was sanctioned against the Pizhdar, who were in their summer-camps in Persian territory, but this move had good effect generally. They remained in Qala Diza from August 1st to 4th. It was unhealthy, full of mosquitoes, and there was a severe heat-wave. Eighty per cent of the force went down with malaria. They came back to Derbend on August 5th, stayed two days, left for Sulaimani via Koi Sanjak on August 9th. Captain C.E.Simpson, M.B.E., I.A.R.O., serving in the Levies was evacuated by air to Sulaimani; but died on arrival there. Colonel Minet left one hundred rifles of the Sulaimani Levy and the Assyrian Machine-Gun Section at Derbend, under Captain J.Bourne, R. of O., 4th Battalion Levies. He left Captain F.J.McWhinnie, R. of O., with one company Sulaimani Levy at Chemchemal, and went on to Sulaimani. Kerim Futteh Beg had gone through Koi Sanjak area and reached Rowanduz on August 9th. On August 16th the Turks advanced, reached Nawdesht that day, and the Shawr valley, north of Rania, on August 18th. Tribal Lashkars were collected to hold up the Turkish advance and defend Rania and villages occupied by Turks were bombed. The bombing was chiefly done by Flight-Lieut. Robb and Kincaid, later the Schneider Cup winner. On the 18th August G.H.Q., ordered the formation of Ranicol. This consisted of:- Two Companies and One Machine-Gun Platoon, 15th Sikhs. One Section, Ambala Pack Battery. One Squadron, 1st Levy Cavalry Regiment. 50 Men, 3rd Levy Cavalry Regiment. 4th Battalion Sulaimani Levy. One Machine-Gun Platoon, Assyrian Levies. Part of this force, namely, one hundred men of the Sulaimani Levy and one section of the Assyrian Machine-Gun Platoon, were already there. One company of the 15th Sikhs and the fifty men of the 3rd Levy Cavalry never went beyond Koi Sanjak. The first unit of this column arrived on August 29th. By the time these troops reached Derbend, the Merga and Chinara Nahiyahs of Rania and Qala Diza were all out of control. On August 30th one dismounted and one mounted company of the Sulaimani Levy, under Captain H.E.D.Orr-Ewing, held Rania; the rest of the force was Derbend. Opposite Derbend, across the Lesser Zab on its south side is a high rocky ridge. This was held by a piquet of twelve men of the 15th Sikhs. At dawn on August 31st, the Kurds rushed this piquet, killing ten, while two wounded got away. From the ridge fire was opened on Derbend Camp and kept up, in spite of air attacks. Many casualties occurred among the horses and mules. As soon as the piquet was lost, orders were sent to Captain Orr-Ewing to march to Derbend. These orders were countermanded; but directly he left Rania it was occupied by enemy parties. At dusk, Captain Orr-Ewing bivouacked at Boskin. Colonel Hughes, 15th Sikhs, commanding at Derbend, ordered the evacuation of the place at dusk. Near Kurrago village the column was fired into and thrown into confusion. It was re-formed and at Boskin finally joined Captain Orr-Ewing, who came there from Rania. Boskin is a village with a mound, trees and plenty of water. Now that Rania was held by the enemy, Colonel Hughes decided to retire to Koi Sanjak. The march began at 10 a.m on September 1st. The plain was full of tribesmen who attacked the column from all sides. The transport, in a panic, got in among the advanced guard. The Sulaimani Cavalry, whose officer two days later deserted to the enemy, took no part in the action. The company of Sulaimani Levy which with the company of 15th Sikhs formed the rear-guard and the Assyrian machine-gunners did well. The column had been marching straight across country, and one part of the Rania plain is a big area of rice-fields. Into this area the column now came, transport and advanced guard mixed up together. Some of the transport became stuck, one gun and a lot of baggage was captured by the Kurds. Here a bayonet charge by the 15th Sikhs accounted for several of the enemy. Other Kurds from the north were coming down on the column from the flank and then just as the column was emerging from the rice-fields two aeroplanes arrived from Kirkuk and machine-gunned the enemy, especially those coming down from the north. They now ceased to press the column which reached Gird-I-Buraise that day and Koi Sanjak on the 2nd September. Total losses of the column were 27 killed, 7 missing, 32 wounded, of which Levies had 13 killed and 19 wounded. The Assyrian machine-gunners, who had done well, were thanked at the end of the operation by the General Officer Commanding. The result of this regrettable affair was that matters became so difficult in the whole eastern area that evacuation of Sulaimani was decided on. A mixed population of sixty-five was evacuated by air, including the Levy officers there. Sheikh Mahmud was left as president of a local elective council to run Sulaimani, and the officers and men of the Levies, with arms and equipment, were handed over to Sheikh Mahmud. The personnel were struck off Levies, but pay continued to be issued to them through the Levy budget. This ceased on Sheikh Mahmud objecting to the arrangement. Some of the personnel of the Sulaimani Levy were on leave, and some in Kirkuk. A certain number tried to rejoin the Levies. This was discouraged, so that Sheikh Mahmud should not be able to say inducements were being held out to the men to leave him. Captain McWhinnies detachment at Chemchemal knew nothing of the evacuation, until aeroplanes passing over, with personnel who were being evacuated, dropped a message on his camp. He remained for the present at Chemchemal. Another affair with unsatisfactory results occurred in the Amadiya area. A party of Barzan Kurds under Sherif Agha, had got into the town and only the timely arrival of a party of Assyrians under the Metropolitan Bishop Mar Sergius, saved the place from looting and destruction and the life of the Qaimakhan. Orders were issued for action to be taken against the Barzan Kurds, and a column consisting of part of the 2nd Battalion Levies and a body of Irregular Assyrians, under Zia De Mar Shimun of the Patriarchal House, and Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiari, the whole being under the command of Lieut-Colonel Bentinck, advanced on Barzan from the west. Another small column to two companies of the 3rd Battalion and the Levy Pack Battery, under command of Major Lake-Geer, marched to Aqra. The Irregulars, with Bentincks column, had pushed on and occupied Barzan, and he with the battalion was at Belinda, when orders came to him for G.H.Q., to return at once. He did so, by a night march from Belinda. No news of this seems to have reached the Irregulars, who after holding Barzan for a short time against the attacks of the Kurds, made their way back with some casualties and great difficulty. The other small column had occupied the top of the Aqra Dagh and one company had burnt Naqaba village in the valley below, when the same orders came, and they went back also. The affair had the unfortunate effect locally of making the Barzan and Zibar Kurds imagine that the column had retired on account of them, and this gave them quite a false impression of their own power.     CHAPTER V 1922-1924   IN October came the change, when the Royal Air Force took over from the Army. Levies, in coming under command of the Vair Vice-Marshal, had the following chain of communication. From O.C. Levies to the Air Vince-Marshal, thence to the Air Ministry, and from there on to the Colonial Office. In October also, Colonel H.T.Dobbvin, D.S.O., took command of the Levies, with the rank of Colonel-Commandant. The late reorganizations and moves had left the Levy units very scattered. They were as follows:-   Levy Head Quarters Baghdad. Moved to Mosul at the end of 1922. 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Mosul. Pack Battery. Mosul. 3rd Battalion. (less 2 Companies). Mosul. 4th Battalion. Mosul. Partly formed. Ordnance. Mosul. M.G.Company Head Quarters. Mosul. Machine Guns were brigaded. 2nd Battalion (Less 3 Companies). Dulip. 2 Companies 2nd Battalion. Zakho. 1 Company 2nd Battalion. Feishkhabur. 2 Companies 3rd Battalion Aqra. 3rd Cavalry Regiment. Atbil. 1st Cavalry Regiment (less 1 Squadron). Kirkuk. 1st Battalion. Nasiriyeh. 1 Squadron 1st Cavalry Regiment. Khanaqin. And of these, to show how races were represented:- 1st and 3rd Cavalry Regiments were Kurds and Turkomans. 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Kurds and Assyrians. 1st Battalion. Marsh Arabs. 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Assyrians. 4th Battalion. Kurds (one Company Mounted). Pack Battery. Assyrians. A little later Yezidis were enlisted. A proposal was made in November to change the name Levies once again, to Iraq Frontier Force. It was not agred to. During all this period, there was great anxiety about Turkish action against Iraq. In March there was a scare in Zakho, on account of the arrival of a Turkish general and staff at Jezireh Ibn Omar, and during the year arrangements were made to meet an attack, in which Levies formed part of two columns, the one operating from Mosul, and taking up a series of defensive positions, the other to be in the area Mindan-Arbil-Kirkuk, Evacuation of families was arranged. A small body of Turks under Euz Demir were holding Rowanduz, and by communicating with Sheikh Mahmud, who in November proclaimed himself King of Kurdistan, and disseminating propaganda among the Kurds, were making matters more and more difficult. In February, Lady Surma De Beit Mar Shimun, the aunt of the Patriarch, wrote in from Bebadi to say that the Tiari and Tkhuma Assyrians, near the Turkish Border, were in danger of attack. It was then decided to occupy Rowanduz, and clear up the whole situation there. Already one small local operation had taken place. On January 19th, the 3rd Regiment Iraq Levies and Police marched from Arbil, and on January 23rd with air operation occupied Wanka without opposition. On the night of the 23rd, however, a Levy post was attacked. Two men were killed and a machine-gun captured, but subsequently recovered. In March the Rowanduz operations began. The force was in two columns, Koicol consisting mainly of British troops under command of Colonel-Commandant B. Vincent, C.B., C.M.G., and Frontiercol consisting entirely of Levies under command of Colonel H.T.Dobbin, D.S.O., Colonel-Commandant of the Iraq Levies. The Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Salsmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., commanded the whole operations. The scheme of operations was an assembly of Koicol at Koi Sanjak, and Frontiercol at Arbil, and then advance on Rowanduz. Koicol coming in from the south via Baliassan and Frontiercol from the west via the Spilik Dagh and Rowanduz gorge. Both columns were closely supported by air action. On March 26th Lieut-Colonel Minet marched from Mosul with the 4th Battalion Levies, the Pack Battery and two platoons of Vickers guns to Arbil. The 2nd Battalion left Mosul on March 29th and the 3rd on the 30th. Column Commander and Staff joined at Arbil by air. The whole column, strength: Officers 25, Other Ranks 2,482 and animals 378, assembled at Arbil on April 5th. The weather was awful, and the country became water-logged. Intention was to march on April 7th, but the start had to be postponed first until the 8th and then until April 10th. On April 10th Frontiercol left Arbil and reached the Bustura Chai. Marched to Dera April 11th, and Duwin Qala April 12th. Here they were stuck in the heavy rain until 15th April, the camp being sniped at night. The column marched on the 15th and crossed the Hurash Chai, which was in blood, and the animals got bogged. They reached the Sorek Chai on the 16th and found the Kurds holding the Spilik Dagh. The Air Officer Commanding directed Frontiercol to remain facing the Spilik Dagh until Koicol could advance sufficiently to outflank them. For the present therefore Frontiercol remained in position. The 2nd Battalion on the left of Frontiercol encountered Kurds in Kani Chirgan and a good deal of firing occurred, but no casualties to the Levies. On the 17th April Captain Littledale, who was in the Dasht-I-Harir with his Police, encountered the enemy in Batas and had a few casualties. The R.A.F. bombed the Spilik Dagh on the 17th and 18th April. Koicol had an action on April 19th and were attacking Baijan Pass on 20th April. On the same day Frontiercol occupied the Spilik Dagh and marched to Qarachin. On April 21st they were at Kani Utman. Orders were issued for the attack on Rowanduz next day, but Euz Demir and the Turks left on the night of April 20th. For the advance Lieut-Colonel Barke took the 3rd Battalion, and linked up with Koicol, a company of the 4th Battalion climbed the Kurik Dagh and Rowanduz was taken on April 22nd. Reconnoitering detachments were pushed out and on April 24th Rab-Tremma Daniel Ismail had a small scrap, and killed on Kurd and brought in some cattle and donkeys. Colonel Dobbin with Frontiercol remained in command at Rowanduz. General Vincent marched with Koicol to deal with the Sulaimani situation. A camp site was chosen near Rowanduz and a landing ground chosen and made at Diana, about three miles away. The 4th Battalion occupied a camp at Kani Utman. The rest of the year was given up to reorganization and administrative matters. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment had now returned to Mosul. Two squadrons had taken over Zakho from the 2nd Battalion when it had marched off to take part in the Rowanduz operations. On the arrival of a battalion of the Iraa Army at Zakho, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment handed over to them and moved to Feishkhabur on April 1st. Here they remained until mid June, and returned to Tank Hill Camp, Mosul. They had a very bad time from malaria. The Remount Depot had been formed at Mosul and came under orders of the O.C. 2nd Cavalry Regiment. The 1st Marsh Arab Battalion moved from Nasiriyeh to Baghdad, where they took over the Residency Guard and Air Headquarters Guard, and also provided one company on duty at rail-head, Shergat. The Levy details camp, to which all personnel arriving for Levies had hitherto reported, closed down on February 29th. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments were amalgamated during April and May and became the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and moved from Mosul to Arbil. In May also the Levy Pay Office moved from Baghdad and opened at Mosul on May 26th. A further reorganization was made in June, when the 2nd Line Transport of the four Infantry Battalions was pooled, and made into a Mule Transport Company under O.C.Remounts. This was found successful and finally adopted in October. In July was started the scheme of enlisting Yezidis for the Levies. It was proposed to form a Yezidi Squadron, which was to form part eventually of the 1st Cavalry Regiment. The officers, who were to be specially enlisted, were to be either Assyrians or Yezidis, but not Moslems, for religious reasons. This scheme did not work, as the Yezidis proved far too difficult to train, and not very amenable to discipline; but they were good with animals. A number of them went finally to the 1st Line Transport of the 4th Battalion, and here gave some trouble, when out on the march. They were all discharged when the 4th Battalion was disbanded. It was found after some experience, that as a rule the Chaldeans did not make good soldiers, and they were gradually discharged. The operations of this year will not be described. The 1st Cavalry Regiment began early in February, when a column went from Kirkuk into the area were the Jaf were camped to enable a peaceful settlement of taxes. This was successfully carried out.   CHAPTER VI 1923-1924   THIS year Sheikh Mahmuds actions in Sulaimani had brought matter to a head. In May 1923, owing to his correspondence with the Turks, he had been ejected from Sulaimani by General Vicent, who had occupied the place; but after the British troops had left, he came back, in July 1923. He remained there throughout the winter, but by May 1924 his tyranny had become so excessive that the High Commissioner sent him an ultimatum, and on an unsatisfactory answer being received Sulaimani was bombed. In May occurred the very unfortunate affair, called The Kirkuk Disturbance, the memory of which has not yet died down. It must be remembered that the Assyrians are not popular in Iraq. Although some of the tribes had lived for centuries in the Sapna area, and others, such as the men of the Baz and Jilu tribes, often came into Mosul and other towns for employment,